Why Did the Romans Oppose the Fabian Strategy?

Quintus Fabius Maximus realized that Hannibal was a military genius and that the best thing to do was not to confront him in battle but to starve him out. He tried to prevent Hannibal’s men from foraging and he forbade farmers from sowing crops in the areas where Hannibal’s army traveled. It was sort of like the scorched earth policy practiced in China during World War Two. This policy did not please many Romans and they called him “Cunctator”-the delayer, and “Hannibal’s pedagogue.”
His own Master of Horse, Marcus Minucius Rufus opposed him. He said “How can you stand idly by and let Hannibal burn all of Italia? When are we going to put a stop to this wanton destruction? Are we come here to see our allies butchered and their property destroyed as a spectacle to be enjoyed? It is folly to suppose that the war can be brought to a conclusion by sitting still, or by prayers. The Troops must be armed and led down to the plain, that you may engage man to man. The Roman power has grown to its present height by courage and activity, not by such dilatory measures as these.”
Minucius even got the Roman Senate to declare him equal to Fabius in command. Fabius was not wiling to alternate days of command so they divided their camps. It did not go well for Minucius and his men when he actually tried to confront Hannibal and fell into one of his traps. Fabius, witnessing the debacle had to bring his troops to rescue Minucius and his men. After that, Minucius ate humble pie and publicly thanked Fabius for saving him and his men and addressed him as “father.”
The Romans were impatient with Fabius’ strategy and they elected as Consul a man named Gaius Tarentius Varro, who stated that he would “bring the war to a conclusion on the very day he got sight of the enemy.” His co-consul, Lucius Aemilius Paullus was a much more cautious man but the Senate authorized the raising of a huge army of Romans and allies to confront Hannibal in Apulia. Under the two Consuls, eighty thousand men went out to Apulia. The subsequent battle of Cannae was an absolute disaster for the Romans. Hannibal accomplished a double envelopment and slaughtered some 55,000 Roman and allied soldiers.
Fabius’ strategy was vindicated, but at this point it would no longer be effective because after the battle of Cannae Hannibal was able to make alliances with many of the Tribes and cities of southern Italy, who would supply his men with sustenance.
Under Fabius’ leadership the war became one of attrition. They largely avoided open confrontation on Hannibal’s terms and over the next ten years they gradually clawed back nearly all of the territory that Hannibal had gained for himself after Cannae. By 206 B.C. Hannibal and his army were confined to a small area in Bruttium.
By then the Romans had developed a military genius of their own, Publius Cornelius Scipio. Scipio conquered Carthaginian Spain within four years, and then he went on to invade Africa and defeat Hannibal at the Battle of Zama, forcing Carthage into a treaty on Roman terms.
If you want to know more details about Quintus Fabius Maximus, read my book, Maximus, Warts and All. It’s available on Amazon and Kindle.