At the time when Hannibal crossed the Alps, 218 B.C., the Romans had no military geniuses, no Roman general could come near to Hannibal in battlefield tactics. In fact, several of the Roman generals in the early battles were notably stupid. Tiberius Sempronius Longus, upon being provoked by Hannibal’s Numidians, sent his unfed infantry wading across the freezing Trebia River. When they arrived across the river, they were hypothermic and nearly unable to wield their weapons. They were easily ambushed by the 5000 men waiting under the command of Hannibal’s brother Mago, and most of the infantry was annihilated.
Six months later, another Roman Consul, Gaius Flaminius, led his legions right into an ambush set by Hannibal by the shores of Lake Trasimene. Fifteen thousand legionaries were killed and some 10,000 captured and, if they were Roman, sold into slavery. Hannibal let the non-Romans go in an effort to conciliate non-Roman populations.
The Romans elected a dictator, Quintus Fabius Maximus who realized that Rome possessed no military leaders who could compete with Hannibal on the battlefield. He devised a strategy that was intended to deprive Hannibal’s army of sustenance. He tried to prevent Italian farmers from providing food for Hannibal’s army and attacked his foraging parties, all the while occupying the high ground hovering over Hannibal’s camps. The strategy might have worked if allowed to continue for a year or two, but the Romans weren’t having it. In the words of Fabius’ own Master of Horse, Marcus Minucius, “Dictator Fabius, how can you stand idly by and let Hannibal burn all of Italia? When are we going to put a stop to this wanton destruction? It is folly to suppose that the war can be brought to a conclusion by sitting still, or by prayers. The troops must be armed and led down to the plain, that you may engage man to man. The Roman power has grown to its present height by courage and activity, not by such dilatory measures as these.”
When Fabius term as Dictator ended, the Romans elected Gaius Terentius Varro and Lucius Aemilius Paullus as Consuls. Paullus was a cautious man, but Varro convinced the Roman Senate to assemble an army of 80,000 Roman and allied soldiers to go out to Apulia and confront Hannibal on the battlefield. Neither Consul was remotely Hannibal’s equal in battlefield tactics and the ensuing battle cost 55,000 Roman and allied lives and some 10,000 captured and sold into slavery. It ranks as one of the most disastrous battles in history.
As a result of this battle, the Romans realized that Fabius had been right, and they largely adopted his strategy of not confronting Hannibal in battle on his terms. Unfortunately, it was now too late for Fabius’ original strategy because Hannibal was now able to make alliances with many of the non-Roman cities and tribes of Italy who would provide his army with sustenance. Rome concentrated on clawing back control of these cities and tribes, conquering some like Capua and Tarentum and selling the survivors into slavery, and enticing others like Arpi and Locri back into the Roman fold. By 206 B.C. they had Hannibal bottled up in a small territory of Bruttium. The year before that they had destroyed the army that Hannibal’s brother Hasdrubal had brought to Italy at the Battle of the Metaurus River. They were also able to prevent Hannibal’s other brother, Mago, who had established a base at Genoa, from uniting with Hannibal’s forces in the south.
Eventually, the Romans developed a military genius of their own, Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus. He drove the Carthaginians from Spain in a military campaign from 209 to 206 B.C. and then returned to Rome to run for Consul. Despite opposition from Fabius, he invaded Africa in 203 B.C., and wreaked enough havoc that the Carthaginians summoned both Hannibal and Mago back to Africa. Scipio defeated Hannibal at the Battle of Zama in 202 B.C. and forced Carthage into a peace treaty on Roman terms.
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